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Abstract. Celebrity endorsements are often sought to influence public opinion. We ask
whether celebrity endorsement per se has an effect beyond the fact that their statements
are seen by many, and whether on net their statements actually lead people to change their
beliefs. To do so, we conducted a nationwide Twitter experiment in Indonesia with 46
high-profile celebrities and organizations, with a total of 7.8 million followers, who agreed
to let us randomly tweet or retweet content promoting immunization from their accounts.
Our design exploits the structure of what information is passed on along a retweet chain on
Twitter to parse reach versus endorsement effects. Endorsements matter: tweets that users
can identify as being originated by a celebrity are far more likely to be liked or retweeted by
users than similar tweets seen by the same users but without the celebrities’ imprimatur. By
contrast, explicitly citing sources in the tweets actually reduces diffusion. By randomizing
which celebrities tweeted when, we find suggestive evidence that overall exposure to the
campaign may influence beliefs about vaccination and knowledge of immunization-seeking
behavior by one’s network. Taken together, the findings suggest an important role for
celebrity endorsement.
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1. Introduction
Social media has allowed celebrities to take an increasing role in social discourse. With
millions of online followers, celebrities have a direct channel to spread messages on a wide
variety of issues, many of which are far removed from their original reason for fame. Their
very participation in ongoing discussions can make issues prominent and shape the zeitgeist.
Examples abound. #BlackLivesMatter, a campaign against racial injustice, is the most-
used social issue Twitter hashtag of all time, with 41 million uses as of September 2018.
Prominent celebrity users include, among others, LeBron James, Drake, Carmelo Anthony,
Kim Kardashian, Colin Kaepernick, Lin-Manuel Miranda, Kerry Washington, Kanye West,
Serena Williams, and Zendaya (with over 211 million non-unique Twitter followers among
them). In public health, the #IceBucketChallenge, promoting awareness of Lou Gehrig’s
disease, became the sixth most used social issue hashtag of all time following participation
by a wide range of celebrities, from Oprah to Bill Gates. Each of these campaigns was
initiated by a less-well-known activist, but was made prominent in part through celebrity
participation.1 As a result, policymakers and firms often seek out celebrity endorsements,
whether to advance public-interest causes or to promote products.
Key questions, however, are both whether and why certain campaigns are so effective. The
first issue concerns why celebrities matter so much. Celebrities have broad reach—people are
watching what Kim Kardashian says or does, and hence her actions and utterances are seen
by many people. Moreover, celebrities may have an endorsement power above and beyond
their reach. The fact that Kim Kardashian was willing to endorse a given product or cause
may lead people to update about the quality of the product or the importance of that cause,
or people may simply want to be like her.2 If the endorsement effect is present, this means
that celebrities have an outsized importance: it is not just that they reach so many people,
but their voice per se has an additional effect.
More generally, the messaging itself may vary in credibility in ways beyond whether it is
explicitly endorsed. For instance, if the tweets used systematically cited verifiable sources,
the information would be less subject to doubt and presumably carry more value. On the
other hand, it is possible that inclusion of credible sources itself discourages passing on the
message. It is also possible that hearing information from multiple different sources may be
more powerful than hearing it from one person. If so, that implies an additional role for
celebrities, as seeding information with very central individuals such as celebrities makes it
more likely that people will hear information from multiple sources.
1Campaigns are typically initiated by lesser-known activists. #BlackLivesMatter was created by writers and
activists Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tomet and #IceBucketChallenge by Peter Frates.
2Of course, it is possible that the endorsement effect could be negative.
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Understanding the nature of social influence is challenging for several reasons. First and
foremost, celebrities’ decisions about whether to make public statements are endogenously
determined and influenced by the general information environment into which they are speak-
ing. People also consume information from such a wide variety of sources that is also near
impossible to isolate the impact of information from a particular source on overall beliefs.
Even if one could credibly solve the endogeneity problem of whether celebrities choose to
speak on a topic, and could isolate the impact on a particular individual, a given action by
a celebrity bundles reach and endorsement effects, making it hard to disentangle why, pre-
cisely, these messages have an impact. Moreover, the precise choice of content and whether
the content involves citing or linking to a source all are subject to endogeneity concerns.
To study these issues, we conducted an experiment through a nationwide immunization
campaign on Twitter from 2015-2016 in Indonesia, in collaboration with the Indonesian Gov-
ernment’s Special Ambassador to the United Nations for Millennium Development Goals.
Working with the Special Ambassador, we recruited 46 high-profile celebrities and organiza-
tions, with a total of over 7.8 million followers, each of whom gave us access to send up to
33 tweets or retweets promoting immunization from their accounts. The content and timing
of each of these tweets was randomly chosen by us from a set of tweets approved by the
Indonesian Ministry of Health, all of which featured a campaign hashtag #AyoImunisasi
(“Let’s Immunize”). All our participants joined knowing that they would not be able to
affect the text or timing of the tweets.3
The experiment randomly varied the tweets along three dimensions: (1) Did the celebrity
/ organization send the tweet from their account, or did they retweet a message (drawn
randomly from the same tweet library) sent by us from an an ordinary (non-celebrity) user’s
account?; (2) Did the tweet explicitly cite a source to bolster its credibility?; (3) Which days
of the campaign did this influencer-tweet/retweet event happen?
The random variation allows us to causally address two sets of questions. First, can we
understand whether and why celebrity-involved campaigns have influence? Is it because
of the reach of the celebrity, the endorsement effect, the content of the message, or the
extent of exposure that they induce through their messaging? Second, does exposure to an
online information campaign about a public health topic lead to changes in beliefs and offline
behavior, through generating conversations and perhaps health-seeking responses?
We chose this setting for several reasons. Indonesia is very active on social media; for
example, in 2012 its capital, Jakarta, originated the most tweets of any city in the world.
Twitter also has a number of useful features for our study. Because both the network (i.e.,
who sees whose tweets) and virtually all information flows over the network (i.e., tweets
and retweets) on Twitter are public information, we can precisely map which individual sees
3Celebrities were allowed to a veto a tweet if they did not want it sent from their account, though this in
fact never happened during the campaign.
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what information, as well as where they saw it from, allowing us to observe for each user
how much exposure they had to precise bits of information. By conducting an experiment,
in which we randomly vary who tweets what when, we can both solve the identification
problem of endogenous speaking behavior, as well as disentangle reach vs. endorsement
effects. Finally, again because of the public nature of Twitter, we can observe people’s
responses to information both online (by observing their online “liking” and “retweeting”
behavior) and offline (by conducting a phone survey of Twitter users and linking their survey
responses to what they saw on Twitter.)
Beyond being a useful lab for our study, Twitter is one of the most important mediums
of information exchange in the world. With over 1 billion users and 328 million active
users, Twitter provides a platform for individuals to broadcast messages widely. Celebrities,
politicians, and organizations are widely followed.4 As such, influencers have a platform to
directly message en masse and engage on timely issues.
We begin with our core question – unpacking why and how celebrity messages may matter
– using variation we induced within celebrities in the nature and content of their tweets. To
tease out the role of celebrity endorsement per se, our design exploits the unique structure
of how information is passed on Twitter. Messages in Twitter are passed on by retweeting
a message to one’s followers. Crucially for our design, when a message is retweeted, the
follower observes who originally composed the tweet, and who retweeted it directly to the
follower, but not any intermediate steps in the path.
We exploit this feature to distinguish reach from endorsement. Consider the difference
between what happens when 1) we have a celebrity directly compose and tweet a message,
compared to 2) when we have a celebrity retweet a message drawn from the same pool of
tweets but originated by a normal citizen (whom we henceforth denote as a “ordinary Joes
and Janes”; these Joes/Janes are also participants on our campaigns).
In the first case, some celebrity followers (whom we denote F1) retweet it to their followers,
whom we denote F2. The followers-of-followers (F2s) observe that the celebrity authored the
message and that F1 retweeted it. But in the second case, when the celebrity retweeted a
Joe/Jane’s message rather than composed it herself, the followers-of-followers of the celebrity
(F2s) observe only that the Joe/Jane tweeted and that F1 then retweeted for F2 to see. Notice
that in this way, F2 is randomly blinded to the celebrity’s involvement in the latter case,
as compared to the former: differences in F2’s behavior therefore correspond to differences
due to knowing that the celebrity was involved.5 In the period we study, the ordering of
4Among the most followed worldwide are Katy Perry (107 million), Barack Obama (104 million), Ellen
DeGeneres (77 million), Kim Kardashian (59 million), Donald Trump (58 million), CNN Breaking News (55
million), Bill Gates (46 million), Narendra Modi (45 million), The New York Times (43 million), LeBron
James (42 million), and Shah Rukh Khan (37 million) as of January 2019.
5A challenge in the design is that the F1 decision to retweet may be endogenous. We discuss this issue in
detail in Section 3.1 below, and show that the results are largely similar in the subset of cases where F1s
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the Twitter feed was strictly chronological, so this design manipulates whether the F2s know
about the celebrities involvement without affecting how prominently the message appeared
in the Twitter feed.
We study the impacts of this induced variation using online reactions to the tweets, i.e.,
likes and retweets, so we can observe the reactions of every individual follower to every
specific tweet.6
We find strong evidence that the celebrity’s endorsement per se matters. In particular, we
find using this design that when an individual observes a given message through a retweet,
and that message was randomized to be composed by a celebrity as compared to an ordinary
individual, there is an 70 percent increase in the number of likes and retweets, compared to
similar messages when the celebrity’s involvement was masked. We find similar results even
when restrict attention to those cases where F1s are participants in the experiment and we
exogenously had them retweet the message, ensuring that whether the F2 was exposed to
the message in the first place was completely exogenous.
We then look to the role of source citation, exploiting our second randomization of whether
a given tweet is randomly assigned to have a verifiable source attached to its claim or not.
We find, perhaps surprisingly, that messages are less likely to be passed on if they are
randomly assigned a source. This is true regardless of whether tweet was composed by the
celebrity themselves, or composed by an ordinary Joe/Jane and retweeted by a celebrity.
The magnitudes are substantial: for instance, randomly attaching a source to a tweet that
the celebrity retweets corresponds to a 50 percent decline in the subsequent retweet rate.
One interpretation is the information is less novel if it is sourced; more generally, we discuss
theoretically how increasing the reliability of information passed has ex ante ambiguous
effects on the probability the information is passed.
The final piece of our online analysis is to examine exposure effects: does hearing a message
multiple times (from multiple different sources) have linear, concave, or convex effects on
the probability of passing on the message? This is important because if an individual passes
on messages after a single exposure (simple contagion) versus requiring many exposures
(complex contagion), the diffusion processes wind up being very different. In the latter case
central individuals such as celebrities may matter more. We find evidence consistent with
complex contagion, but with concave effects: while going from one to two messages increases
the probability of retweeting two-fold, and going from one to three increases the probability
by 2.5-fold, the effect flattens out after that.
were also study participants whom we randomly selected and forced to retweet exogenously, and hence the
sample of exposed F2s is identical.
6Recall that a “like” corresponds to simply clicking a button to indicate that one likes the message (and
the action is not pushed to one’s followers), while “retweet” subsequently passes on the tweet to all of one’s
followers. While it is certainly the case, a priori, that individuals may retweet tweets that they even disagree
with, adding commentary or simply ironically, “liking” the tweet directly conveys approval.
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Taken together, the findings suggest an important set of considerations in policy design of
a social media campaign. Celebrity involvement is crucial, not only for their direct broadcast
effect but their endorsement effects as well. In contrast, perhaps counterintuitively, sources
can actually slow down a campaign. And at the margin, efforts should be placed not to
repeated messaging but rather to wider messaging: a budget of messages should be spread
out to maximize repeated exposure.
Given that people seem to pay attention to the campaign online – liking and retweeting
celebrity messages on immunization – a natural next question is whether such a campaign
has effects on real-world beliefs, knowledge, and behavior. To study this, we used the timing
of the tweets to randomly generate differences in exposure to our campaign. Specifically,
we randomized the celebrities into two groups, with the first group assigned to tweet during
July and August 2015 (Phase I) and the second group assigned to tweet from November
2015 - February 2016 (Phases II and III). We conducted a phone survey of a subset of
followers of our celebrities in between these two groups of tweets. Since we know which of
our celebrities each of these followers followed at baseline, this randomization into two phases
generates random variation in how many immunization-related tweets from our campaign
each individual had potentially been exposed to as of the time of our survey.
The evidence using this variation, while suggestive, indicates that exposure to celebrity en-
dorsements does have measurable effects. We begin by showing that people did pay attention:
a one standard deviation increase in exposure to the campaign due to our randomization,
equivalent to about 15 tweets or retweets showing up on a user’s Twitter feed over a period of
about one month, corresponds to a 20 percent increase in the probability that the respondent
in the phone survey knows about our hashtag, #AyoImunisasi; an 11 percent increase in the
probability they have heard about immunization through Twitter; and a 14 percent increase
in the number of times they report having heard about immunization through Twitter. We
then show that exposure to the campaign may have increased knowledge about immuniza-
tion. We asked phone respondents a number of factual questions about immunization (e.g.,
whether the vaccine was domestically produced, an important public message for the Gov-
ernment as domestically produced vaccines are known to be halal and hence allowed under
Muslim law), all of which were addressed in some of the campaign tweets. A one standard
deviation increase in exposure to the campaign corresponds to a 12 percent increase in the
probability that the respondent knows that vaccines are domestic (on a base of 58 percent
in knowledge in the whole sample), though no increase in the three other dimensions of
knowledge we examined.
We then turn to respondents’ knowledge of immunization behavior in their neighbor,
friend, and relative networks. In particular, we ask whether knowledge of immunization
WHEN CELEBRITIES SPEAK 6
behavior of members of each of these networks increased, which is a soft measure of of-
fline discussion about immunization in their respective networks. Again we find effects of
the celebrity pro-immunization campaign: a one standard deviation increase in exposure
corresponds to a 23 percent increase in the probability of knowing about one’s neighbors’
recent immunization behavior. We find no increases in knowledge for friends and relatives.
The idea that one would learn about immunization decisions of neighbors is consistent with
immunization practices in Indonesia, which take place at posyandu meetings, staffed by a
midwife, that occur each month in each neighborhood (dusun or RW ) of Indonesia (Olken
et al., 2014).
We look at changes in reported immunization decisions of respondents and those in their
network. We find no effects on one’s own immunization decisions, though our statistical
power is such that we cannot rule out substantial effects. This is not surprising, because it
is unlikely that any given member of our sample had a child exactly in the duration of our
study. But casting a wider net, we find consistent evidence that in each type of network—
neighbors, relatives, and friends—of those exposed to the campaign, those exposed to the
Twitter campaign were more likely to report that their network members actually immunized
their children. In sum, while the estimates in each domain are suggestive, taken together we
find consistent evidence that celebrity endorsements actually may affect a combination of
offline knowledge about facts and the knowledge of health status and health-seeking behavior
by one’s neighbor, friend, and relative network members.
Related Literature. This work relates to a literature on the diffusion of information for
public policy (Ryan and Gross, 1943; Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Conley and Udry, 2010;
Katona, Zubcsek, and Sarvary, 2011; Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson, 2013;
Beaman, BenYishay, Magruder, and Mobarak, 2016). To our knowledge, our paper repre-
sents the largest randomized controlled trial of an online diffusion experiment, particularly
one that involves major influencers. Moreover, while this literature has studied the flow of
information over social networks, and how position in the network affects the flow of informa-
tion, it has typically been silent on whether the identity of the individual who passes on the
information matters per se.7 Indeed, this is because normally the identity of an individual
and that individual’s position in the network go hand-in-hand, so varying who is sending
the information changes both of these simultaneously; our experimental design, by contrast,
allows us to separate these two effects.
Moreover, unlike these previous studies, which have been carried out in smaller scales,
we note that our study represents exactly the kind of public awareness campaign that gov-
ernments and large-scale policymakers are interested in, as represented by the Ministry of
7An important exception is Beaman and Dillon (2018) who look at how gender plays a role in information
diffusion.
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Health’s and World Bank’s interest in partnership. To our knowledge, something like this
has never been studied experimentally before.
There is also a literature on generating online cascades (Leskovec et al., 2007; Bakshy
et al., 2011). This literature follows online diffusions through Twitter, Facebook, and other
social media, and through observational studies looks at what drives and does not drive
diffusion. Much of the literature concludes that under a wide range of assumptions, it is
more worthwhile to seed a message through a bunch of ordinary citizens as compared to
identifying and targeting any particular influencer. As the research notes, however, there
is no causal evidence for the role of influencers here, and certainly no causal evidence to
parse what aspects of celebrity involvement matters. Of course, in observational studies,
what celebrities say, whether they cite sources, whether they endorse others’ messages are
all endogenous. Our experiment allows us to move past this. Further, by linking our online
behavior to offline beliefs and behavior, we can take a step towards measuring, albeit in a
limited and minimal way, policy impact.
Furthermore, the paper speaks to a literature that has looked at how media exposure affects
behavior, with an emphasis on civic engagement. The literature demonstrates that exposure
to mass media such as newspapers, television, and radios can contribute to health-seeking
behavior, political positioning, voting behavior, and economic behavior more generally (see,
e.g., Alsan and Wanamaker, 2017; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004; DellaVigna and Kaplan,
2007; Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson, 2011;
DellaVigna, Enikolopov, Mironova, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya, 2014; Martin and Yurukoglu,
2017; Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2016; Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017). Our paper moves to social
media, studying the online and offline effects of a large-scale social network campaign.8
Finally, there has also been recent theoretical work exploring how (and whether) policy-
makers should identify “central” individuals in a network to generate diffusion.9 Our results
show that (i) people are much more likely to pass on information if it originally came from a
well-connected source (e.g., a celebrity), (ii) individuals are more likely to pass it on if they
hear if from multiple distinct sources, (iii) there are only a few celebrities, and (iv) that an
online public health campaign generates only short-timed diffusions. The results therefore
confirm the importance of seeding information with influential people.
8In that sense, our paper is related to Enikolopov, Makarin, and Petrova (2016), who use variation in the
overall spread of a social network in Russia due to connections with the network’s founder, and look at
the effects of greater vs. less participation in social media on political outcomes. By contrast, our paper
generates random variation in exposure within the social network. It is also related to Gong, Zhang, Zhao,
and Jiang (2017), who experimentally vary tweets in China on Sina Weibo about TV programs and measure
the impact on TV viewership.
9See Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2003, 2005); Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013);
Kim, Hwong, Staff, Hughes, O’Malley, Fowler, and Christakis (2015); Beaman, BenYishay, Magruder, and
Mobarak (2016); Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2018a); Akbarpour, Malladi, and Saberi
(2018).
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Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the setting,
recruitment, experimental design, and sample statistics. In Section 3, we present our main
results. We study the mechanisms of the online diffusion process and explore a variety of
endorsement effects. Then Section 4 asks whether the increased online chatter corresponds
to offline changes in beliefs and behavior. Section 5 concludes.
2. Experiment
2.1. Setting and Sample. Our study took place in Indonesia in 2015 and 2016. Despite
being a developing country, Indonesia is quite active on social media and an excellent place to
study social media dynamics. Indonesia ranks fourth worldwide in the number of Facebook
accounts, with 126 million10 in 2017 (about half the population); it also ranks third in the
number of Twitter accounts, with over 16.8 million (about 6.4 percent of the population).11
These Twitter users are active as well: in 2012, a study that linked individual tweets to their
cities of origin found that Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, was the top city producing tweets
anywhere in the world, narrowly exceeding Tokyo.12
The focus of the experiment was on improving immunization. Immunization was chosen
as it was a government priority, as Indonesia was trying to improve its immunization rates
as part of its drive to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. A set of 550 tweets was
developed in close coordination with the Ministry of Health that sought to improve informa-
tion about immunization. The tweets included information about access to immunization
(i.e., immunizations are free, available at government clinics, and so on); information about
the importance of immunization (i.e., immunizations are crucial to combat child diseases);
and information designed to combat common myths about immunization (i.e., vaccines are
made domestically in Indonesia and are therefore halal). For each tweet, we also identified a
source (either a specific link or an organization’s Twitter handle). All tweets were approved
by the Ministry of Health, and all included a common hashtag, #AyoImunisasi (“Let’s Im-
munize”). Each tweet was written in Indonesian, and two versions were prepared—one using
formal Indonesian, and one using casual/street Indonesian, to match the written tweeting
styles of the participants.
With help from the Indonesian Special Ambassador to the United Nations for Millennium
Development Goals, we recruited 37 high-profile Twitter users, whom we denote “celebrities,”
with a total of 7.8 million Twitter followers, to participate in our experiment. These “celebri-
ties” come from a wide range of backgrounds, including pop music stars, TV personalities,
10https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on-number-of-
facebook-users/
11https://www.statista.com/statistics/490548/twitter-users-indonesia/
12https://semiocast.com/en/publications/2012_07_30_Twitter_reaches_half_a_billion_
accounts_140m_in_the_US
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actors and actresses, motivational speakers, government officials, and public intellectuals.
They have a mean of 262,647 Twitter followers each, with several having more than one mil-
lion followers. We also recruited 9 organizations involved in public advocacy and/or health
issues in Indonesia with a mean of 132,300 followers each.
In addition to the celebrities, we recruited 1032 ordinary citizens, whom we call “ordinary
Joes and Janes”. The role of the Joes/Janes will be to allow us to have essentially unimpor-
tant, everyday individuals compose tweets that are then retweeted by celebrities, which will
be important for identification. These Joes/Janes consist primarily of university students at
a variety of Indonesian universities. They are far more typical in their Twitter profiles, with
a mean of 511 followers.
Every participant (both celebrities and Joes/Janes) consented to signing up with our app
that (1) lets us tweet content from their account (13, 23, or 33 times), (2) randomize the
content of the tweets from a large list of 549 immunization tweets approved by the Ministry
of Health, and (3) has no scope for editing. Participants were given two choices: (1) the
maximum number of tweets to authorize (13, 23, or 33), and (2) a writing style for the tweet
(to better approximate their normal writing style), either formal or slang language.13
2.2. Experimental Design. Our experiment is designed to understand which aspects of
social media campaigns are important for disseminating a message. The choices we have at
our disposal are (a) the originator of the message (a Joe/Jane or a celebrity), (b) whether
the message contains a credible source, (c) the content of the message, and (d) whether
the campaign should emphasize repeated messaging to the same people or more widespread
messaging. Ex ante it may seem obvious, for instance, that sources are better (after all the
information is more credible) and celebrity involvement is better (after all, for a variety of
reasons the information may be viewed as more credible). But thinking carefully about the
retweeting process demonstrates that, in fact, the effect of each of these design options is
actually theoretically ambiguous, and hence ultimately an empirical question. Appendix A
presents an application of a simple model by Chandrasekhar, Golub, and Yang (2018) to
demonstrate the ambiguity, though certainly other models can be used.
The experimental design consists of the randomizing the content and timing of tweets and
retweets among our participants. The design has two main components. First, to investigate
the role of celebrity endorsements, we randomized the content of tweets and whether they
were tweeted or retweeted by celebrities. We describe each of these in turn. Second, to mea-
sure the overall impact of the Twitter campaign on offline beliefs, we randomized celebrities
into phases (i.e., in which months particular celebrities tweeted); this allows us to generate
random variation in the amount of exposure a particular follower had received at the time
of our survey.
13The website showed sample tweets to demonstrate the style.
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First, within each phase, we randomized virtually all aspects of the tweets. Specifically,
we randomized the precise timing of tweets (which day and what time of day); which tweet
from our pre-prepared bank of approved tweets was tweeted by whom and when; whether
a tweet was tweeted directly by a celebrity, or tweeted by a Joe/Jane and then retweeted
by a celebrity; and, for a subset of tweets, whether the tweet included the ‘credibility boost’
(i.e., the source link or referring organization’s Twitter handle).14 In addition, in Phase III,
all tweets / retweets by a celebrity were then retweeted by a randomly selected number of
Joes/Janes. These various randomizations allow us to identify the role of celebrity reach vs.
endorsement, as well as the role of repeated exposure to information, as described in more
detail in Section 3 below. A schematic of the design is provided in Figure 1.
Second, to measure the overall effect of exposure, we randomized our celebrities into
two groups, stratified by number of followers (above or below median), style, celebrity or
organization, and tweet count. Group I celebrities tweeted in the first phase of the experiment
(July and August 2015), while Group II celebrities tweeted in the second and third phases of
the experiment (November 2015 - February 2016) (see Figure 2). The key point is that our
offline endline survey (see Section 2.3) was conducted in between these two phases (i.e., late
August - October 2015). This means that, conditional on the number of celebrities in our
study a given Twitter user follows, at the time of the endline survey it is random how many
of these celebrities have actually tweeted about immunization. We use this between-celebrity
randomization to estimate the impact of the Twitter campaign on offline beliefs in Section
4 below.
Summarizing, the experimental design is as follows:
• Every celebrity and organization is randomly assigned either to Phase I or Phases
II/III.
• Conditional on being active in a phase, each celebrity is active on a given day with
probability that corresponds to the number of tweets/retweets the celebrity or or-
ganization signed up for being randomly distributed over the days in the assigned
phase.
• Conditional on being active in a given day, each celebrity tweets one time.
• Each tweet event on a given day is then randomly assigned a time from the empir-
ical distribution of tweets by day-of-week we have from historical Twitter data in
Indonesia, constrained between the hours of 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. Jakarta time.
14Note that in the period we study, a Twitter user saw all tweets and retweets from the users they follow
in strict reverse chronological order (i.e., newest tweets appeared first, and so on). Twitter subsequently (in
March 2016) applied an algorithm to prioritize the ordering of the tweets, but since in the period we study
(July 2015 through February 2016) tweets appeared in strictly chronological order, our experimental design
does not affect the ordering of tweets in a user’s Twitter feed.
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• Conditional on a given tweet/retweet event, it is randomly assigned with probability
1/2 to be an celebrity-composed tweet and with probability 1/2 to be a Joe/Jane-
composed tweet with the celebrity or organization retweeting it.
• Each of these events is then randomly drawn a tweet from the tweet bank, conditional
on the organization or celebrity’s style.
• For a subset of tweets, they were randomized to receive a source.15
2.3. Data. We use two types of data in the study, Online Data, (i.e., data collected via
Twitter about behavior on the Twitter platform with respect to our tweets), and Offline
Data, (i.e., data collected via a phone survey about respondents’ beliefs). We discuss these
in turn.
2.3.1. Online data. We collected detailed data on relevant behavior on the Twitter platform
via the Twitter Firehose and Twitter API. Before the experiment began, in early 2015, we
collected an image of the publicly available Twitter network, including the list of followers
of any celebrity participating in our study. This allows us to construct the follower network
in Indonesia at baseline.
There are two main types of behaviors that people who see tweets can do, “likes” and
“retweets”. A like is a expression of approval of the tweet. A retweet is when someone who
has seen a tweet rebroadcasts it to their entire follower network; this allows information
to propagate over the Twitter network. There are two main differences between likes and
retweets. First, retweets do not necessarily imply endorsement of the views of a tweet,
whereas likes do. Second, while likes are visible (a user can look up which tweets another
user has liked, and can look up who has liked a given tweet), likes are not automatically
pushed out as tweets to a user’s followers. An example of a campaign tweet, with a source,
is depicted in Figure 3.
For each the of the 672 total tweets that were originated by our experiment, we tracked
each time the tweet was liked or retweeted by any of the over 5.5 million unique users who
followed at least one of the participants in our study. When the tweet was retweeted by
a celebrity’s follower, we also scraped all of this follower’s followers and their liking and
retweeting behavior.16 For each of these events, we used the complete follower network (and
followers’ followers when the follower retweeted) from the baseline to construct the shortest
path through which the tweet could have reached the user. We denote those retweets / likes
coming from a direct follower of a celebrity as F1 events, and those retweets / likes coming
15Another set of tweets always carried a source because they covered more sensitive material. They were
also given priority to be sent out, so they comprise a larger share of low tweet count celebrities’ tweets.
Consequently in analyzing source citation, we condition appropriately on non-sensitive tweets, to ensure we
only compare non-sensitive material tweets which would be randomly assigned to receive a source.
16Since a given user can follow multiple celebrities, the 7.8 million total followers of celebrities in our sample
represents 5.5 million unique users.
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from a follower of a follower of a celebrity as F2 events. We use the distinction between F1
and F2 events in more detail in the analysis below.
Table 1, Panel A reports descriptive statistics using Twitter data on our subjects. Our
celebrities on average have 262,648 followers whereas the organizations have 145,300 follow-
ers. The followers of our celebrities have on average 1,379 followers. The Joes/Janes that
we recruited have on average 508 followers.
2.3.2. Offline data. To measure whether online conversations led to offline behavioral changes,
we conducted a phone survey on a sample of 2,441 subjects, all of whom followed at least
one of our study participants on Twitter. The phone survey was designed to capture infor-
mation about immunization (including beliefs in some of the various myths our tweets were
intended to counteract), immunization history for children in the family and knowledge of
recent immunizations of children of close friends, and questions about immunization and
Twitter.
To recruit this sample, we advertised with promoted tweets on Twitter a recruitment to
participate in a healthcare survey that particularly targeted women. We specifically targeted
the recruitment ads to the 5.5 million unique users who followed participants in our study,
with higher rates of ads for women and for individuals who followed more than one study
participant. When users came to the website to sign up to participate, we obtained their
Twitter handle so that we could link them to the Twitter network. This process resulted in
2,441 total subjects, all of whom we could link to Twitter. All respondents were surveyed
by phone during the endline period; we also contacted a subsample of these respondents
(approximately 73 percent) by phone for a baseline survey prior to the beginning of Phase I
tweets.
Table 1, Panel B reports demographics of our offline survey sample. To gauge the sam-
ple selection in our sample, we also present comparable data from the 2014 wave of the
SUSENAS, the annual representative Indonesian national household survey. Relative to the
nationally representative SUSENAS sample, we see that our demographic is more urban,
slightly younger, and have a similar gender composition.
Panel C reports baseline statistics for beliefs about vaccinations. We see that there is
considerable confusion about the nature and value of vaccines. For instance, only 56 per-
cent of individuals thought that vaccines are domestically made (they are), and only 38.5
percent thought that vaccines are free of cost (they are). This suggests substantial room for
improvement on immunization knowledge in our study sample.
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3. The Value of Endorsement
This section explores our main results that characterize the value of endorsement per se.
The key idea is that if a celebrity is known to be involved in passing a message, or have
authored a message, this provides scope for an endorsement effect. Similarly, a message
explicitly listing a source may be more likely to be passed on if viewed as more credible,
whereas if it lacks a source, this may impede transmission. On the other hand, source
inclusion may impede transmission, say if passing such a benefit accrues the sender less
social value. Further, multiple exposures as compared to a single exposure may lead to more
passing of information.
To untangle these mechanisms, in this section we use the variation we induced at the tweet
level—i.e., the randomly induced variation in who tweeted or retweeted what when. Since
the variation we explore here is much finer, our outcome variables must also be at the level
of the individual tweet.17 We therefore focus in this section on online responses—“likes” and
“retweets” by ordinary Twitter users of messages composed or shared by our celebrities—
that allow us to differentiate responses both tweet by tweet, and also differentially depending
on how a particular tweet reached a particular user.
3.1. Value of celebrity involvement. We begin by asking whether a celebrity’s influence
in diffusion on social media is due simply to their reach (the size of their network) or also
because when they pass on it is more likely to be subsequently passed on (the endorsement
effect due to their involvement).
Our identification strategy exploits a particular feature of retweets in Twitter. A respon-
dent j who sees a retweet observes two names: the name of the original writer of the tweet,
and of the person whom j follows who retweeted it. Any names in between—say, a follower
of the original writer who retweeted it to the person who retweeted it to j—are unobserved.
We exploit this feature of Twitter—that intermediaries in a retweet chain are lost—in
our experimental design, as summarized in Figure 5. Consider a chain from a celebrity to
some follower F1 and then to some follower of this follower (who does not directly follow the
celebrity) F2. If the celebrity retweets the message by a Joe/Jane, and then this is retweeted
by F1, observe that F2 sees the message, sees that it is composed by a Joe/Jane, and knows
that F1 retweeted it. But crucially F2 does not know that the celebrity had retweeted it: F2
is likely to be blind to the celebrity’s involvement. On the other hand, if the celebrity had
written this tweet herself rather than retweeted it, this would be visible to the F2. This is
depicted in Figure 5.
17In particular, the randomizations we exploit here are within-celebrity, and hence within-Phase. Therefore
we cannot use other tweet-level randomizations in this section to look at offline beliefs or behavior.
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By randomizing whether the message is originally tweeted by the celebrity, or instead
originally tweeted by a Joe/Jane and then retweeted by the celebrity, we can identify the
celebrity endorsement effect by looking at F2’s behavior.
To test this, we estimate, by Poisson regression, the equation
(3.1) E[ytrcmp|xtrcmp] = exp (α · Celebtcm + β · log(Followers)r + ωc + ωm + ωp)
where t indexes a tweet, r indexes a retweeter (i.e., an F1 who retweeted the tweet t),
c indexes a celebrity, m indexes the type of message content, and p indexes phase. The
variable Celebtcm is a dummy that takes 1 if the celebrity authored the tweet herself (and
hence her identity if visible to the F2), and 0 if the celebrity retweeted a Joe/Jane (and hence
her identity is not visible to the F2). Each observation is a retweet of one of our original
tweets, and the dependent variable ytrcmp is a count of how many times this retweet was
itself either liked or retweeted again by an F2. Since y is a count, we estimate a Poisson
regression, with robust standard errors to allow for arbitrary variance terms clustered at
the original tweet (t) level. We control for the log number of followers of the F1, and for
dummies (ωm) for the different types of messages (e.g., dummies for it being about a fact,
importance of immunization, etc). All regressions include celebrity fixed effects (ωc), which
absorb variation casual/formal style chosen, etc., as well as phase fixed effects (ωp). Standard
errors are clustered at the level of original tweet t, which is the level at which Celebtcm is
randomized.
The key coefficient of interest is α, which measures the differential impact of the tweet
having been written by the celebrity (as compared to being written by a Joe/Jane) and this
being observable to the F2-level person making the decision to retweet.
Table 2 presents our results. As discussed in more detail in Section 2.3.1 above, we have
three main outcome variables: (1) whether the agent either liked or retweeted the tweet, (2)
whether an agent liked the tweet, and (3) whether an agent retweeted the tweet. Columns
1, 3, and 5 present the results on the full sample for each of these dependent variables.
We see large endorsement effects. Having a celebrity compose and tweet the message
relative to having a Joe/Jane compose the message and the celebrity retweeting it leads to
a 1.7-fold increase in the retweet or like rate (column 1, p = 0.001; note that since this is a
Poisson model, the coefficients are interpretable as the change in log number of retweets) by
followers-of-followers (F2s) . The results are similar when we look at likes or retweets alone.
These results imply that, holding the content of the tweet constant (since it is random-
ized across tweets) and holding the F2 position in the network constant (since they are all
followers-of-followers of the celebrity), having the F2 be aware of the celebrity’s involvement
in passing the message almost triples the likelihood that the F2 responds online.
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We document similar effects of an organization being the originator rather than a Joe/Jane
in Table D.1 of Appendix D.18 We show that similar to celebrity effect, an organization
being randomly assigned to compose a message rather than a Joe/Jane has a substantial
endorsement effect of similar magnitude.
There are, however, two main potential threats to our identification strategy here. The
first is that when we look at F2 agents, i.e., those who are at distance two from the celebrity
of interest, whether a given agent sees a retweet from his or her F1’s may be endogenous and
respond to our treatment. Namely, which F1s choose to retweet the message may be directly
affected by the fact that the celebrity composed the message, rather than retweeting it from
a Joe/Jane. In equation (3.1), we always control for the log number of followers of the F1
who retweeted the message, and hence the number of F2s who could potentially retweet it,
so there is no mechanical reason there would be a bias in equation (3.1). But there may
nevertheless be a compositional difference in which F1’s retweet it, which could potentially
lead to selection bias in terms of which F2s are more likely to see the retweet in the first
place.
To address this issue, in Phase III of the experiment, we added an additional randomiza-
tion. Specifically, in Phase III of the experiment we use the subset of Joe/Jane who are also
F1s, and so direct followers of our celebrities. For some of these Joes/Janes, we randomly
had their accounts retweet our celebrities’ tweets and retweets in the experiment; that is,
we created exogenous F1s. For this sample, we can look at how their followers—that is, the
followers of F1 Joe/Jane’s we exogenously forced to retweet a particular tweet—responded
as we randomly vary whether the celebrity, an organization, or a Joe/Jane composes the
message. We analyze this experiment by estimating equation (3.1) just as we did for the full
sample of F2s, but for this sample we have the advantage that whether an F2 sees the tweet
is guaranteed to be exogenous by construction.
Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the results. The point estimates are if anything somewhat
larger than those in the full sample, and we cannot reject equality. Statistical significance is
reduced somewhat in this restricted sample (p-values of 0.119, 0.111, and 0.107 in columns
2, 4, and 6 respectively), but the fact that results are broadly similar to the overall effects
in columns 1, 3, and 5 suggests that the possible endogenous selection of F1s in our whole
sample is not leading to substantial bias.19
18Recall that we only have 7 organizations, which reduces the overall instances of such cases, so we relegate
this to an appendix. Also, we condition on non-sensitive tweets for this sample.
19Note that the mean level of retweets in this sample is 0.01, compared to 0.04 in the main sample, which
leads to larger standard errors in these columns in a Poisson model. Of course, there is no reason the F2s
in this sample would have necessarily have the same retweet rates overall as in the main sample; the point
of this exercise is to make sure the F2s are exogenous to Celebtcm, but this sample by construction is not
meant to be a representative subsample of the entire F2 network.
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The second potential confound comes from the fact that a retweet carries with it informa-
tion about how many times the original tweet has been retweeted or liked as of the time the
user views it (see Figure 3, which shows the number of retweets next to the arrow graphic
and the number of likes next to the heart graphic). One may worry then that since our
treatment assignment affects the retweet count, this itself could spur further changes in the
likelihood of retweeting. The same Phase III randomization of forced Joe/Jane retweets
also helps us address this issue, because we randomly varied the number of Joes/Janes we
forced to retweet a particular tweet. Appendix C, Table C.1 presents a Poisson regressions of
retweets and likes on the number of Joes/Janes that were forced to retweet a given celebrity’s
tweet or retweet (this is of course net of the forced Joe/Janes’ behavior). What we find is
that being randomly assigned one, five, ten, or even fifteen extra retweets makes no impact
on the number of F1 or F2 retweets that the given tweet faces.
Taken together, our results suggest that an agent who knows that the message was com-
posed by an authority in the sense of a celebrity as compared to thinking it is a random
individual is 1.7 times more likely to retweet or like the tweet. This indicates that there is
a large endorsement effect.
3.2. Value of celebrity authorship. The preceding analysis compared individuals who
were effectively randomly blinded to whether a celebrity was or was not involved in the
message composition and passing in order to estimate an endorsement effect. We next
ask, for a given individual, even if they know that a celebrity is involved and endorsing
the message by passing it on, is there an extra endorsement effect from knowing that the
celebrity composed it as compared to simply being a conduit?
Table 3 presents the results of Poisson regressions at the tweet level. That is, we now
restrict to direct followers of the celebrity (F1 individuals), and estimate
(3.2) E[ytcmp|xtcmp] = exp (α · Celebtcm + ωc + ωm + ωp) .
We now have one observation per tweet, and look at the number of retweets/likes, retweets,
or likes by F1 agents who are distance 1 from the celebrity passing along the tweet. We
continue to include celebrity (ωc), phase (ωp), and message-type (ωm) fixed effects. We are
interested in whether the tweet being randomly assigned to be composed by the Joes/Janes
versus the celebrity leads to a higher retweet rate.
We find evidence of a large endorsement through authorship effect for celebrities with the
retweet/like rate increasing 3-fold (column 1, p < 0.001). In fact, an agent who observes
a tweet composed from the celebrity rather than a retweet of a Joe/Jane is 2.2 times more
likely to like the tweet (column 2, p < 0.001) and 3.8 time more likely to retweet the tweet
(column 3, p < 0.001).
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Again, keeping in mind that we have only 7 organizations, we can look at the same effect
of a celebrity retweeting an organization rather than a Joe/Jane in Table D.2 of Appendix
D.20 We find no added value here: that is, a celebrity retweeting a Joe/Jane and a celebrity
retweeting an organization is just as valuable, whereas if the celebrity is known to have
composed the message there is a large premium.
On net, the results in this section complement the results in Section 3.1, which together
paint a consistent picture: celebrity endorsement seems to substantially increase the proba-
bility messages are passed on or liked, both overall (as above) and even within the distinction
of a celebrity writing vs. retweeting the same message.
3.3. Value of source citation. The next question we ask is whether including source
citation increases diffusive behavior. Source citations in our context come in several forms.
First, sources are simply provided though there is no verifiable references. This is of the form
“Polio vaccine should be given 4 times at months 1, 2, 3, 4. Are your baby’s polio vaccines
complete? @puskomdepkes’ where “@puskomdepkes” is a link to the Twitter handle of the
Ministry of Health (known as DepKes in Indonesian). Second, explicit sources are cited, and
there is a Google shortened link provided.21
To examine this question, we re-estimate equation (3.2) at the F1 level, but also add a
variable that captures whether the tweet was randomly selected to include a source.22 Table
4 presents the results. Columns 1-4 look at pooled likes and retweets, 5-8 look at retweets,
and 9-12 look at likes. We also condition the regressions to the sample where the celebrity
retweets the Joes/Janes (columns 2, 6, 10), the celebrity directly tweets (columns 3, 7, 11),
and the celebrity retweets an organization (columns 4, 8, 12).
On average, pooling across all messaging configurations we find that source citation reduces
the retweet and liking rate by 26.3 percent (p = 0.051). This is particularly driven by reduced
retweeting behavior (a decline of 27.2 percent, p = 0.048). Disaggregating across whether the
celebrity composed and tweeted the message or retweeted a Joe/Jane or an organization,
we find that the large reductions in retweet rates persist when a Joe/Jane composed the
message (a 50 percent decline, p = 0.02) or when the celebrity directly tweets the message
(a 29.3 percent decline, p = 0.002). Sources only cease to have an adverse effect and wind
up having no effect when an organization itself (here largely health based organizations)
originally tweets the message, which is consistent with the idea that the organization itself
is essentially interpreted as a source.
20We must condition on non-sensitive topic tweets for this analysis.
21Note that Twitter automatically produces a short preview of the content if the site linked to has Twitter
cards set up. There is one non-Google shortened link used when citing IDAI (Ikatan Dokter Anak Indonesia,
the Indonesian Pediatric Society).
22Note that the number of observations is smaller here, because some tweets on topics deemed ‘sensitive’ by
the Government always included a source, as we noted above. We restrict the analysis here to those tweets
for which we randomized whether the source was included or not.
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In sum, for both Joes/Janes and celebrities, including a source in tweets ultimately de-
presses retweet rates and the extent of diffusion. This result—that sources depress retweet
rates—may seem surprising, since one might expect that a sourced message may be more
reliable. But recall the discussion in Section 2.2 suggesting that each feature of the message
(e.g., originator identity, sourcing) could have ex ante ambiguous effects on retweet rates.
There are a number of possible explanations for this finding. One idea is that for an F1
passing on a message has both instrumental value (delivering a good message), as well as
a signaling value (conveying to followers that the F1 is able to discern which information is
good). We discuss in Appendix A how adding a source could potentially reduce the signaling
value and possible lead to lower retweet rates (alongside a more general discussion of how
celebrity origination, source citation, exposure, and specific content could all either increase
or decrease retweet rates ex ante). Various other stories are possible as well. For instance,
it is also possible that F1s interpreted a sourced message as less authentic-sounding than
an unsourced message, or perhaps the information sounds less novel when sourced. Regard-
less, the result suggests that adding explicit credibility-boosts to celebrity messages does not
necessarily increase diffusion.
3.4. Value of multiple exposures. Lastly we look at the role of multiple exposures as
compared to a single exposure. In models of diffusion there is a contrast between “simple”
and “complex” contagion models, both of which are extensively studied. The distinction
matters for the design of campaigns aiming to maximize diffusion. In simple contagion,
adoption happens at the point of a single exposure to the information. In contrast, there
are “complex contagion” models, wherein an individual must have multiple exposures before
adoption (Centola and Macy, 2007; Romero, Meeder, and Kleinberg, 2011; Ghasemiesfeh,
Ebrahimi, and Gao, 2013).23 Beaman, BenYishay, Magruder, and Mobarak (2016) provide
evidence in favor of complex contagion in a different setting—that of technological adoption
in rural networks. While the networks literature across myriad disciplines (e.g., computer
science, applied math, sociology, economics) have different perspectives on why this may
be the case, roughly speaking complex contagion processes differ from simple contagion
processes in that there is a premium for identifying central individuals. This makes it
considerably more likely that a given individual in the network receives multiple exposures
and thereby affects the odds of something going viral.
23A micro-foundation for complex contagion-like behavior is as follows: consider a Bayesian individual who
is unsure about whether it is worthwhile to tweet or retweet about immunization. Her default is to not
tweet: she only tweets or retweets if she is sure enough that it is worthwhile, because say there is a small
cost to passing on a message that is not worth it. In this case, she only acts when she is sure enough; with
enough exposures she may clear the threshold and then act, and at that point a marginal exposure should
not matter.
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To get at these issues, we look at whether there are linear or non-linear effects to exposure
to a message. Table 5 presents a Poisson regression to examine the shape of the response
function. We look at all agents at the F1 level, who are followers of our celebrity in question,
and the observation is at the user-date level. We ask how the number of retweets of our
campaign’s tweets that they see from celebrities they follow on that day by the agent depends
on the (randomly assigned) exposure to tweets on the given day. Since celebrities are only
assigned to tweet once per day, multiple signals will come from users who follow multiple
celebrities. Further, because we are interested in non-linear effects, we condition on a sample
who follow at least 3 celebrities. We estimate a regression of the form
(3.3) E[yid|xid] = exp
(
α +
K∑
k=2
βk1{Exposure to k tweets todayid}+ µi + µd
)
,
where yid is the number of retweets that an F1 individual i makes on date d out of the set of
campaign tweets that he is directly exposed to from celebrities he follows and which includes
user and date fixed effects.
Going from 1 exposure to 2 exposures leads to just over a two-fold increase in the retweet
rate or a 110 percent increase in the retweet rate (p = 0.01). That there is an effect suggests
that we are not in a world of simple contagion. Then going from 1 to 3 corresponds to a
2.6-fold or 160 percent increase in the retweet rate (p = 0.08). Finally going to 4-7 exposures
leads to no differential retweet rate relative to 1, though the point estimate is large but noisily
estimated. This clearly rejects a linear effect model: the first additional exposure contributes
to the largest increase in the retweet rate, the second additional tweet has additional value,
and there is no effect for marginal exposures, which indicates concavity.
On net, the evidence suggests the retweet shape function begins linearly and then flattens
out. This is inconsistent with simple contagion. But moreover, notice this is also inconsistent
with a model of attention where an agent randomly checks her phone and then decides to
retweet, since in this case the retweet count should scale linearly, but in fact it is concave.
Ultimately, the evidence is consistent with a complex contagion-like model that having
multiple tacit endorsements is enough to make it worthwhile for the user to behave. This
is particularly important because the theory demonstrates that there is a striking difference
in whether a policymaker must strive to contact the “right” individuals (central individuals)
or not—complex contagion models have a premium in seeding information with influential.
The data then shows that even without the endorsement effect itself, seeding influential
individuals with information would have more value simply through the fact that it would
generate more multiple exposures.
3.5. Discussion. In this section we have studied how endorsement effects of various kinds
may influence consumption of and passing on information. The results are nuanced. Our
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design allows us to parse the endorsement effect of a celebrity from the reach effect, and
using this approach, we find the endorsement effect per se to be large: both likes and
retweets increase considerably when a celebrity is randomly assigned to write the same
message as a Joe/Jane. At the same time, inclusion of credible sourcing in the message
does not help: on average it reduces retweeting. Further exposures themselves do matter,
contrary to common views on diffusion, but in a concave way. Multiple exposures help at
the outset but subsequently decline in marginal value.
This suggests certain important themes to focus on in future studies of diffusion. First,
more attention ought to be paid to “node identity”—that is, who is involved in writing or
passing the information and at what stage. This plays an enormous role in our setting, as
having the celebrity be the source plays an outsized role per se. This type of concern is
often swept aside, due to the obvious complexities, in typical studies of diffusion. A notable
exception is Beaman and Dillon (2018), who focus on how the gender of the individual in the
network strongly affects diffusion of information. Second, the results suggest certain types of
diffusion are more likely: in this case multiple exposures (closer in spirit to complex conta-
gion) plays a crucial role, in keeping with recent work in other contexts (e.g., Beaman et al.
(2016) for technology adoption). Third, the extent of diffusion itself, typically parametrized
either by time or the intrinsic virality of the information, may greatly depend on the topic.
While taken for granted, there is limited research in terms of how we expect diffusion to
differ by content-type and how this interacts with both the who and the how much.
4. Does Online Discussion Have Offline Effects?
Next we ask whether an online celebrity endorsement campaign can begin to have mea-
surable offline effects. To investigate this, we use the fact that between Phases I and II,
we conducted an offline phone survey, as described in Section 2, so that conditional on the
number of our celebrities a user followed, exposure to our campaign as of the time of the
phone survey was randomly assigned.
Figure 4 presents a schematic of the identification. Because those who followed Phase I
celebrities faced greater campaign exposure, and celebrities and organizations were randomly
binned into Phase I versus II/III, we can look at how exposure to the campaign in terms
of tweets at the end of Phase I affects knowledge and behavior. Note that because users
who follow more of our celebrities are mechanically more likely to follow people who were
in Phase I, we always condition on the potential exposure, i.e., the number of celebrities in
our study they follow and how many tweets those celebrities agreed to send as part of the
campaign. We thus exploit the random variation in actual Phase I exposure conditional on
potential Phase I exposure.
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4.1. Did people hear about the campaign? We begin with what can be thought of as
akin to a first-stage in Table 6. We ask whether respondents were more likely to have heard of
our hashtag (#AyoImunisasi) or heard about immunization discussions from Twitter if they
were randomly more exposed to campaign tweets, conditional on their potential exposure. In
particular, given a location in the network, each respondent had a potential exposure under
our campaign, which was a function of how many tweets/retweets were assigned to each
celebrity they followed. Relative to this, the actual exposure uses the fact that because we
randomized which celebrities went in Phase I and which in Phases II-III, there was random
variation in actual exposure relative to potential exposure when we survey between Phases
I and II-III.
We run logistic and Poisson regressions are of the form
(4.1) f(yi) = α + β · Exposure to Tweetsi + γ · Potential Exposurei + δ′Xi,
where yi is either whether the agent has heard of our hashtag #AyoImunisasi, whether
the agent has heard of immunization in general from Twitter, or the number of times they
have heard about immunization from Twitter, and f(·) is the appropriate function for logit
(log-odds, i.e., log
(
P(yi=1|xi)
1−P(yi=1|xi)
)
) or Poisson regression (log of expected count, log(E[yi|xi])).
Exposure to Tweetsi is the number of campaign tweets that i is randomized to see through
Phase I (normalized to have standard deviation 1). Potential Exposurei is the total number
of campaign tweets that i could potentially seeing through the campaign given the celebri-
ties he follows. X are controls, such as the number of celebrities followed by i, the log of
the number of followers of celebrities by i, survey dates, and (in some specifications) demo-
graphics and baseline beliefs, selected here and in subsequent regressions by double post-
LASSO (Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen, 2014a,b).24 We report standard errors and
p-values clustered at the level of the combination of celebrities followed; further, because
of the complex nature of the potential correlation in Exposure to Tweetsi across individuals
i induced by partial overlap in which celebrities our survey respondents follow, we present
24Simply put, as we have many potential covariates for which we could control, by employing machine
learning (in this case LASSO), we can in a disciplined manner select which controls ought to be used. The
double post-LASSO algorithm applies the LASSO to all covariates to select all variables that are sufficiently
predictive of the outcome directly (as in a reduced form) and all variables that are sufficiently predictive of
the treatment status (as in a first stage), and then the union of these LASSO-selected variables are included
as the right controls in our main regression (4.1). Results are qualitatively similar dropping controls and
including all controls, though results using LASSO-selected controls have slightly higher power.
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randomization-inference p-values as well.25 The experimental design of randomizing celebri-
ties into phases means that, while individuals i may differ in the number of our celebrities
they follow, Exposure to Tweetsi is random conditional on Potential Exposurei.
Columns 1 examines whether the respondent heard of #AyoImunisasi (and therefore re-
members the exact hashtag), column 2 examines whether the respondent heard of a discussion
of immunization on Twitter, and column 3 examines the number of times the respondent
heard of such discussions.
We find that a one-standard deviation increase in exposure to the campaign (15 tweets)
corresponds to a 16.75 percent increase in the probability that the respondent had heard of
our hashtag relative to a mean of 7.7 percent (clustered p = 0.044, RI p = 0.107).26 Further,
a one-standard deviation increase in exposure corresponds to a 8.3 percent increase in the
probability they heard about immunization in general from Twitter relative to a mean of
18.1 percent (clustered p = 0.106, RI p = 0.046). Finally looking at the number of times
they heard about immunization from Twitter, there is a 11.2 percent increase relative to a
mean of 0.322 times (clustered p = 0.044, RI p = 0.127).
Overall, we do see people seem to have noticed the campaign: the randomized increased
exposure to our campaign tweets corresponds to more knowledge of our hashtags and being
more likely to have heard of immunization on Twitter in the general population.
4.2. Did people then increase their knowledge about immunization facts? Next we
ask whether exposure to the campaign led to increased knowledge about immunization. Our
survey asks questions about several categories of knowledge. First, we check for knowledge of
several common “myths” about vaccination that our campaign tried to cover. In particular,
we ask whether people know that vaccines are domestically produced, to combat the com-
mon rumor in Indonesia that they contain pig products in production (which would make
them unacceptable for Muslims, who represent the vast majority of Indonesia’s population;
domestic products are known to be halal). Second, we ask whether they believe that natural
alternatives (breastfeeding, herbal supplements, alternative supplements) replace the need
for immunization. Third, we ask whether they are aware that typical symptoms (mild fevers
or swelling) are to be expected and not a cause for alarm. The second category we ask
about is “access” information; in particular, we ask whether they know that it is free to get
one’s child vaccinated at government health centers. All of these issues were covered in the
campaign.
25Specifically, we re-run our randomization programs 2,000 times to generate alternative possible configu-
rations of celebrities randomized into Phase I and II/III, fully respecting the stratification and other ran-
domization parameters. We use these alternate randomization results to generate randomization-inference
p-values.
26Note that the table reports impacts on log-odds; we report marginal effects in the text, which are inter-
pretable as percent increases. For example, the 16.75 percent increase in column 1 corresponds to an increase
in 0.197 in log-odds.
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The fact that we emphasize the role of messages that dispel myths, such as the fact that
vaccines are not domestically produced (and therefore may not be halal), is echoed in online
behavior. In particular, Table B.1 in Appendix B shows that that tweets concerning myths
diffused more widely than facts that were non-myths, meaning that the exposure would
have been more about myth-busting facts. Moreover, myth-dispelling facts comprised 36.7
percent of all tweets and 82.4 percent of all fact-related tweets sent out (i.e., myths compared
to other facts).
Table 7 presents the results for each of these four categories of information. Column 1
presents whether they understood vaccines were domestically produced. Columns 2 and 3
check whether respondents understood that the substitutes are invalid and the side-effects
are negligible. As described above, these three are the predominant myth-busting facts
provided that we asked about in our survey. Column 4 checks whether they understand that
immunization is freely provided, which concerns access. We find knowledge effects for our
most prominent tweet—domestic production—though not on rumors about substitutability,
side-effects, nor free access. Seeing 15 campaign tweets in general corresponded to an increase
of 5 percent in the probability of correctly answering the domestic question on a base of 57.6
percent (clustered p = 0.042, RI p = 0.028; if we adjust for the fact that 4 questions are asked
using a Bonferroni-style adjustment; these p-values would be 0.168 and 0.112, respectively).
4.3. Knowledge and behavior of network members. We then look to measurements
of knowledge and reported behavior by respondents and those in their neighbor, friend, and
relative networks. First we ask whether the respondents’ knowledge of immunization status
in each type of network increases. Then, given this, we examine the respondent’s reports of
recent immunization behavior by those in each type of network, as well as own immunization
behavior. Looking at networks allows us to paint a picture of a wider set of individuals—after
all, having a young child exactly in this age range is a sparse event—but it is important to
note that the caveat that this is as reported by the respondent, not observed by us directly.
4.3.1. Knowledge about immunization practices of others. We begin by asking whether in-
dividuals were more likely to know about what their neighbors, friends, and relatives’ im-
munization behavior was, which would be a byproduct of offline conversations since June
2015 to capture the campaign’s effect. Panel A of Table 8 presents the results. Unsurpris-
ingly, the relative network has the highest mean knowledge to begin with (after all, health
conversations presumably are very frequent within family), whereas geographic neighbors
have the lowest mean. A similar thing is true among friends. In Indonesia, immunizations
take place at monthly posyandu meetings, which occur each month in each neighborhood
(usually hamlets, or dusun, in rural areas, and neighborhoods known as rukun warga, or RW,
in urban areas; see Olken, Onishi, and Wong (2014)), so if knowledge would increase, one
might expect it to be the knowledge about immunization practices of ones’ neighbors. Note
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that here the sample is restricted to respondents who know friends, relatives, or neighbors
with at least one child (ages 0-5) respectively as this is the relevant set, which reduces the
survey sample.
In column 1 we see that being exposed to 15 more tweets corresponds to a 5.2 percent
increase in the probability of knowing the neighbor’s status (clustered p = 0.004, RI p =
0.088). We do not consistently see significant effects on non-neighbor friends. With relatives
the point estimates are comparably large, though the estimates are noisier. In any case,
this is also consistent with the idea that for the most part, individuals have a higher rate of
knowledge of health status of those they have closer relationships with (e.g., relatives) and
that this is unlikely to change.27
4.3.2. Did exposure lead to changes in immunization rate? The last question to ask is whether,
among those who knew their friends, neighbors, or relatives’ immunization behavior, is there
more immunizing behavior since June 2015 when there is more exposure to the campaign?
That is, does the campaign appear change immunization behavior as reported by our survey
respondents?
Panel B of Table 8 presents the results, where the dependent variable is whether the re-
spondent knows of anyone among their friends, neighbors, or family who immunized a child.
Specifically, we condition the sample when we look at knowledge among the network to those
who knew whether the vaccination status of the children of members of their network (neigh-
bors, friends, and family), so this effect is distinct from the effects reported above. Then
we ask whether exposure to treatment is associated with greater incidence of vaccination
take-up within their network.
An important caveat to this table is that knowledge of the network members’ children’s
vaccination status itself is affected by treatment (as discussed above). This is particularly
true for the network of neighbors. If knowledge is itself affected by treatment, there can
be at least two natural interpretations of these results. The first interpretation is that if
the increase in reporting one’s child’s vaccination status to one’s friend is unrelated to the
actual status itself, then this regression picks up the treatment effect on vaccination itself.
The second interpretation is that the treatment causes differential reporting of status to one’s
neighbors, so those who took up vaccination for their children may be more likely to speak
about it. This is consistent with the results of Banerjee et al. (2013), where microfinance
takers were nearly seven times more likely to pass on information about microcredit than
those who were informed about it but chose not to adopt. To take another example, with
more exposure, one may attend neighborhood health centers more and therefore observes
27We also asked the respondents to rate on a scale of 1-4 whether they felt immunization was beneficial, safe,
and important. The median response is a 4 (the maximal score) and respondents overwhelmingly reported
this (means are 3.7, 3.4, and 3.8 on the three questions, respectively). The data is essentially top-coded but
we present the result in Table E.1 in Appendix E.
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more neighbors who take-up there. We cannot separate between the two interpretations, but
we present the results nonetheless, advising that the estimates are to be interpreted with
some caution.
Column 1 shows that when looking at the network of neighbors, an increased exposure
by 15 tweets corresponds to a 12.5 percent increase in the number of vaccinations in the
network (clustered p = 0.071, RI p = 0.132) relative to a mean of 0.356. When turning to
the network of friends in column 2, we see an increased exposure by 15 tweets corresponds
to a 16.0 percent increase in the number of vaccinations in the network (clustered p = 0.001,
RI p = 0.071) relative to a mean of 0.353. Column 3 presents results looking at relatives.
An increased exposure by 15 tweets corresponds to a 9.6 percent increase in the number of
vaccinations in the network (clustered p = 0.159, RI p = 0.06) relative to a mean of 0.314.
Finally, Column 4 looks at own behavior, and our estimate is not statistically different
from zero. This is unsurprising as it is very rare that a respondent is exactly well-timed to
have a child in the vaccination period during our experiment.
4.4. Discussion. In this section we have shown that being randomly exposed to only 15
more campaign tweets on immunization leads to roughly a 10-20 percent increase in awareness
that an immunization campaign is going on, taking the awareness rate from a mean of
8-18 percent to 10-20 percent overall. While each individual result is suggestive, taken
together they paint a consistent picture: a moderate-intensity Twitter campaign seems to
have changed people’s beliefs and knowledge. It is worth noting that our campaign represents
a mild exposure for a variety of reasons: people’s feeds are flooded with many tweets so
being exposed over multiple months to a dozen or so tweets on a specific topic may not be
on anyone’s radar. Moreover, this requires checking one’s feed around the time that the
tweet is sent out, which is a sparse event. Nonetheless, the mild increased awareness due to
a light-touch exposure measurably led to large increases in the probability that respondents
knew that vaccines were domestically produced. It also increased offline conversations with
network members so as to learn their (children’s) vaccination statuses and possibly increased
vaccination take-up behavior (or at least awareness of vaccination behavior in the network).
5. Conclusion
We conducted a nationwide campaign, which consisted of randomized controlled trial on
Twitter involving 37 celebrities and 9 organizations, to promote immunization and examine
online diffusion and offline belief change.
We begin by studying what makes an effective campaign. First we decompose celebrity
influence through reach and endorsement. We find that celebrity endorsement matters con-
siderably. We then show that source citation has an adverse effect on diffusion. Further,
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we show that there are decreasing returns to exposure: while the second exposure matters,
individuals are no more likely to retweet after the third exposure to the campaign.
We then demonstrated that an online campaign can lead to changes in offline beliefs and
knowledge, as measured by an separate phone survey. For instance, exposure to our campaign
leads to both individuals knowing more about the details of immunization provision (e.g.,
know that they can keep halal while vaccinating their child due to domestic production).
Further, individuals exposed to the campaign are much more likely to know the immunization
seeking behavior and status of their friends, neighbors, and family, meaning that it likely
spurred offline discussion. We also find suggestive evidence of higher reported immunization
behavior changes by respondents’ friends, relatives, and neighbors.
Our findings shed some light on what effective policy might look like. A simple rule
of thumb is to recruit influential agents, like celebrities, to send messages without citing
credible sources. With a fixed budget of messages, locating these messages such that there
are multiple exposures, but not being wasteful, would then generate the widest diffusion. All
of this is not only because mechanically influential agents are connected to more people, but
also because subsequent individuals are considerably more likely to respond to the message
when it is sent by influential agents such as celebrities (as evidenced by both likes and
retweets). Simply seeing the message 15 times over a four-month period can lead to sizeable
shifts in offline knowledge and potentially even health-seeking behavior.
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Figure 1. Experimental Design Schematic: Conditional on style, formal or
casual, a half of the celebrity’s tweets are assigned to direct and the other half
are assigned to be retweeted. A subset of tweets (those that are not deemed
sensitive by the government) are randomly assigned to be with or without
crediblity boost. The retweets are either conducted by an organization, with
probability 1/3, or a Joe with probability 2/3.
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Jan 12, 2016 - Feb 10, 2016
Phase III
Nov 19, 2015 - Dec 4, 2016
Phase II
Aug 19, 2015 - October 30, 2015
Offline Survey
Endline
July 2, 2015 - Aug 16, 2015
Phase I
May 22, 2015 - June 19, 2015
Offline Survey
Baseline
March 2015
Baseline Twitter image
Figure 2. Timeline
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(a) Celebrity Tweet: casual with credibility boost
(b) Celebrity retweeting an Organization: casual with credi-
bility boost
(c) Celebrity retweeting a Joe: formal without credibility boost
Figure 3. Sample tweets and retweets from the campaign
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Celeb
Celeb
Celeb
Celeb
(a) Twitter network with offline survey nodes denoted by
diamond
Celeb
Celeb
Celeb
Celeb
(b) Phase I treatment celebrities and treated nodes and
offline survey respondents colored in blue. Offline survey
respondents beliefs affected by treatment measured by com-
paring blue and white diamonds.
Figure 4. Offline impact randomization schematic
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Joe Celeb F1 F2
(a) Message M originated by Joe (b) F2’s observation
Joe Celeb F1 F2
(c) Message M originated by Celeb (d) F2’s observation
Figure 5. Identification of the value of endorsement of celebrity involvement.
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Tables
Table 1. User summary stats
Panel A: Online user summary
mean obs
Followers of celebrities 262648 37
Followers of organizations 145300 9
Followers of Joes/Janes 574 134
Followers of forced Joes/Janes 502 898
Followers of celeb followers 1379 1073
Panel B: Offline user summary
Sample National Average (SUSENAS)
mean mean
Age 28.416 29.959
Female 0.504 0.499
City (kota) 0.610 0.200
Panel C: Baseline beliefs
mean obs
Immunization is important 0.988 886
Immunization is safe 0.944 886
Immunization is beneficial 0.983 886
Breastfeeding can’t replace immunization 0.650 886
Supplements can’t replace immunization 0.872 886
Herbal supplements can’t replace immunization 0.832 886
BCG is a basic vaccine 0.452 622
Hepatitis B is a basic vaccine 0.291 622
DPT is a basic vaccine 0.399 622
HIB is a basic vaccine 0.084 622
Polio is a basic vaccine 0.712 622
Measles is a basic vaccine 0.611 622
Immunization does not cause swelling 0.561 886
Immunization does not cause fever 0.647 886
Vaccines are domestically made 0.561 886
Vaccines are free of cost 0.385 886
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Table 2. Reach vs. Endorsement: Value of Celeb Endorsement through
Involvement measured by F2 likes/retweets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES # Pooled # Pooled # Retweets # Retweets # Likes # Likes
Celeb writes and tweets 0.544 0.788 0.518 0.931 0.664 1.109
(0.166) (0.505) (0.166) (0.584) (0.482) (0.687)
[0.00105] [0.119] [0.00175] [0.111] [0.168] [0.107]
Observations 1,997 911 1,997 911 1,997 911
Joe/Jane writes mean 0.0417 0.00915 0.0417 0.00686 0.00745 0.00229
Forced Joes/Janes only X X X
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the original tweet level) are reported in parentheses. p-
values are reported in brackets. Sample conditions on all tweets originated by Joes/Janes or
celebrities. All regressions control for phase, celebrity fixed effects, content fixed effects, and
the log number of followers of the F1.
Table 3. Value of Celeb Endorsement through Composition measured by F1
likes/retweets
(1) (2) (3)
Poisson Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES # Pooled # Retweets # Likes
Celeb writes and tweets 1.101 1.329 0.803
(0.0840) (0.0910) (0.105)
[0] [0] [0]
Observations 451 451 451
Joe/Jane writes and Celeb retweets mean 2.058 1.045 1.013
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the original tweet level) are reported
in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. Sample conditions on all
tweets originated by Joes/Janes or celebrities. All regressions control for
phase, celebrity fixed effects, and content fixed effects.
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Table 4. Value of Endorsement through Source Citation measured by F1 likes/retweets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES # Pooled # Pooled # Pooled # Pooled # Retweets # Retweets # Retweets # Retweets # Likes # Likes # Likes # Likes
Source cited -0.306 -0.553 -0.235 -0.0365 -0.318 -0.694 -0.347 0.0946 -0.277 -0.261 0.0104 -0.239
(0.157) (0.248) (0.109) (0.207) (0.161) (0.297) (0.113) (0.186) (0.183) (0.236) (0.248) (0.297)
[0.0513] [0.0260] [0.0319] [0.860] [0.0478] [0.0195] [0.00222] [0.612] [0.130] [0.269] [0.967] [0.421]
Observations 492 170 131 191 492 170 131 191 492 170 131 191
Depvar Mean 3.644 2.635 7.305 2.031 3.644 2.635 7.305 2.031 3.644 2.635 7.305 2.031
Celeb RT Joe/Jane X X X
Celeb RT Org X X X
Celeb Direct X X X
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the celebrity/organization level) are reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. All regressions control for
phase, celebrity fixed effects, content fixed effects, and condition on non-sensitive tweets.
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Table 5. Shape of response function: Value
of exposure
(1)
Poisson
VARIABLES Retweet
Exposure to 2 tweets today 0.740
(0.293)
[0.0114]
Exposure to 3 tweets today 0.948
(0.549)
[0.0839]
Exposure to 4-7 tweets today 0.703
(0.890)
[0.430]
Observations 15,263
Potential tweet exposure control X
User FE X
Phase control X
Date FE X
Depvar Mean 0.0300
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at user
level) are reported in parentheses. p-values
are reported in brackets.
WHEN CELEBRITIES SPEAK 38
Table 6. Did people offline hear about the campaign?
(1) (2) (3)
Logit Logit Poisson
Heard of Heard of # of times
VARIABLES #Ayoimunisasi immunization from Twitter heard from Twitter
Std. Exposure to tweets 0.197 0.108 0.106
(0.0980) (0.0666) (0.0529)
[0.0443] [0.106] [0.0444]
{.107} {.046} {.127}
Observations 2,164 2,404 2,441
Potential exposure control X X X
Double Post-LASSO X X X
Depvar Mean 0.0776 0.181 0.322
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the combination of celebs followed level) are reported in
parentheses. Clustered p-values are reported in brackets. Randomization inference (RI) p-values
are reported in braces. Demographic controls include age, sex, province, dummy for urban area
and dummy for having children. One standard deviation of exposure is 14.96 tweets.
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Table 7. Did people offline increase knowledge?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Logit Logit
VARIABLES Domestic Substitutes Side-effects Free
Std. Exposure to tweets 0.120 -0.0391 0.0305 0.0549
(0.0591) (0.0589) (0.0624) (0.0687)
[0.0424] [0.506] [0.625] [0.424]
{.028} {.891} {.751} {.629}
Observations 2,434 2,440 2,440 2,440
Potential exposure control X X X X
Double Post-LASSO X X X X
Depvar Mean 0.576 0.527 0.486 0.680
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the combination of celebs followed level)
are reported in parentheses. Clustered p-values are reported in brackets.
Randomization inference (RI) p-values are reported in braces. Demographic
controls include age, sex, province, dummy for urban area and dummy for
having children. One standard deviation of exposure is 14.96 tweets.
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Table 8. Networks and behavior
Panel A: Knowledge of neighbor, friend, and relative network
members’ immunization behavior
(1) (2) (3)
Logit Logit Logit
VARIABLES Neighbor Friend Relative
Std. Exposure to tweets 0.231 0.0156 0.214
(0.0814) (0.0826) (0.132)
[0.00449] [0.850] [0.105]
{.088} {.778} {.462}
Observations 1,642 1,626 1,564
Potential exposure control X X X
Double Post-LASSO X X X
Depvar Mean 0.775 0.813 0.923
Panel B: Immunization behavior of neighbors, friends, and relatives
network members as well as self
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit Logit Logit Logit
VARIABLES Neighbor Friend Relative Own
Std. Exposure to tweets 0.194 0.246 0.140 -0.0840
(0.107) (0.0955) (0.0997) (0.0886)
[0.0707] [0.00994] [0.159] [0.343]
{.132} {.071} {.06} {.66}
Observations 682 682 682 634
Potential exposure control X X X X
Double post-LASSO X X X X
Depvar Mean 0.356 0.353 0.314 0.486
Notes: In both panels, standard errors (clustered at the combina-
tion of celebs followed level) are reported in parentheses. Clustered
p-values are reported in brackets. Randomization inference (RI) p-
values are reported in braces. Demographic controls include age, sex,
province, dummy for urban area and dummy for having children. One
standard deviation of exposure is 14.96 tweets. In Panel A, the sam-
ple is restricted to respondents who know friends/relatives/neighbors
with at least one child (ages 0-5) respectively. In Panel B, the sam-
ple when looking at network members’ behaviors (columns 1-3) is
restricted to respondents who know the behavior of their network.
When looking at own behavior in column 4, sample restricted to re-
spondents with children younger than age 2.
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Appendix A. Model
A.1. Overview. We study the decision by individuals on Twitter to pass on information to
their followers by “retweeting” it. Before proceding to our empirical analysis, we begin by
discussing a simple framework to think through how individuals make the decision to pass
on information. The framework is standard, developed in Chandrasekhar, Golub, and Yang
(2018) and also previously applied in Banerjee, Breza, Chandrasekhar, and Golub (2018b).
In our framework, individuals pass on information for two reasons. First, individuals may
care that others are informed about a topic. Second, as retweeting is intrinsicially a social
activity, individuals can be motivated by how they are viewed by their followers. In this case,
individuals may choose to retweet certain topics as a function of how the act of sharing the
information changes how they are perceived by others. For example, individuals on Twitter
may be trying to gather more followers, and it is plausible that people are more likely to
keep following someone whom they believe is sharing high-quality information.
This second observation—that people may share information with a view to it affects how
others perceive them—turns out to have subtle ramifications for how we think about a dis-
semination strategy. Whether information is more likely to spread more widely if originated
by a celebrity or an ordinary Joe, whether messages cite credible sources or simply consist of
assertions, whether the messaging involves multiple exposures, and even whether the topic
consists of more well-known ideas or dispelling persistent myths, turn out to be ambiguous
questions once we include the fact that these features of messages change the degree to
which sharing the message provides information in equilibrium about the likely quality of
the person deciding whether to share it.
In particular, the standard intuition is that that more and credible information is simply
better, and hence more likely to be retweeted. This comes from a standard model in which
individuals only base their decisions to pass on information based on the first factor, namely
the quality of that information. In this case, if a message has more credibility, has a verified
source, has a history of multiple exposure, or has higher marginal value (in the sense that
it dispels otherwise wrong beliefs), the more retweeting should happen. This generates an
intuition that, for instance, sourced tweets or celebrity tweets should be retweeted more.
However, when we consider the fact that retweeting has a social component—that individ-
uals certainly care about how they are perceived and that is likely a key component of their
motivation to retweet—we see that these conclusions change. Assume that an individual F
follows an originator of a tweet, o. Suppose that F is more willing to pass on information
if he is more certain about the state of the world. Also assume that F can be one of two
private types: a high type (greater ability or social consciousness for the sake of discussion)
and a low type. Individuals desire to be perceived of as a high type by their followers, so
part of the motivation to retweet is for this social perception payoff. It is commonly known
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that high types are better able to assess the state of the world rather than low types (i.e.,
imagine that in addition to the tweet, individual F gets a private signal as to the state of
the world, and the high types’ signal is more informative). When F sees a tweet by o, he
needs to glean the state of the world using both the tweet and his own private signal, and
decide whether or not to retweet.
To illustrate ideas, let us compare the case where o’s tweet contains no source versus cites
a credible source about the topic. Inclusion of a source has multiple effects. First, the source
citation should make the state of the world even more evident. This should encourage
retweeting through increasing certainty. Second, and more subtly, if social perception is
important enough, source citation can have a discouraging effect on retweeting. Specifically,
if a source makes it very clear what is true, then there is no room for signaling remaining:
high types are no better able to assess things than low types and therefore ability does not
really matter. We show below that which effect dominates on net—the increased direct effect
of the source on quality, or the fact that the source decreases the ability of F to use the
tweet to signal quality—turns out to be ambiguous.
To show this more formally, we adapt the endogenous communication model developed
by Chandrasekhar, Golub, and Yang (2018) to our context of retweeting on Twitter (see
also Banerjee et al. (2018b) for another such prior application of this model). Such image
concerns have also been looked both theoretically and empirically in both Bursztyn and
Jensen (2015); Bursztyn, Egorov, and Jensen (2017) who study whether peer perceptions
inhibit the seeking of education. We look at individuals who have payoffs from passing
on information and who are concerned with social perception as well the direct value of
the information they pass. We show how that sourcing, originator identity, exposure, and
content all can have ambiguous effects on the amount of retweeting, and explore when we
might expect which policies to work well.
It is important to note that we are not claiming of course that these are the only motives
for retweeting. After all there can be more mundane motivations: it is just more fun to
retweet anything by a celebrity, or it is just frivolous to retweet anything by a celebrity, for
instance. But without hardcoding anything else into the model, in the simplest interpretation
of dynamics on Twitter, we can demonstrate and motivate why ultimately the questions we
study are ultimately empirical issues.
A.2. Setup.
A.2.1. Environment. The state of the world is given by η ∈ {0, 1}, with each state equally
likely. There is an originator o (she) who writes an initial message about the idea with
probability q ∈ (0, 1], which is received by her follower F (he). With probability 1 − q
nothing happens. The message is a binary signal about the state of the world, which is
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accurate with probability α, i.e.
m =
η w.p. α ≥
1
2
1− η o.w.
.
The message may or may not cite a source, designated by z ∈ {S,NS} respectively. We
allow the quality of the signal to depend on source, so α = αz, discussed below.
Further, there are two types of originators: ordinary Janes/Joes and celebrities, given
by o ∈ {J,C} respectively. We allow the quality of the signal to depend on originator, so
α = αo, discussed below.
Finally, followers come in two varieties: θ ∈ {H,L} represents F ’s privately known type,
and one’s type is drawn with equal odds. High types have better private information about
the state of the world. This can represent ability in a loose way such as intelligence, social
accumen, taste-making ability, or any trait which allows F to better discern the state of
the world if he is of type H rather than L. We model this by supposing that F draws an
auxiliary signal, x, with x = η with probability piθ and x = 1−η with probability 1−piθ. We
assume piH ≥ piL which reflects that H-types can better discern whether the idea is valuable.
As discussed below, it is socially desirable to be perceived as θ = H.
This environment captures our basic experimental setting. We randomly vary originator
o ∈ {J,C} and whether the message is sourced, z ∈ {S,NS}. We also vary whether the
topic concerns a myth, which is modeled by F having worse beliefs about the true state of
the world pimythθ ≤ pinon−mythθ , and varying the number of exposures which is simply modeled
by the number of prior signals that F has received.
A.2.2. Bayesian Updating. F is assumed to be Bayesian. Let α = αo,z be the quality of the
signal depending on originator and source. Therefore given message m and private signal x,
we can compute the likelihood ratio that F believes the state of the world being good versus
bad as
LR (η|m,x; o, z, θ) = P (η = 1|m,x)P (η = 0|m,x) =
P (m,x|η = 1)
P (m,x|η = 0)
=
(
αo,z
1− αo,z
)m (1− αo,z
αo,z
)1−m (
piθ
1− piθ
)x (1− piθ
piθ
)1−x
.
Note that as α or pi tend to 1 or 12 , the likelihood ratio tends to +∞ (the signal reveals the
state) or 1 (the signal has no content), respectively.
A.2.3. Payoffs. The utility of F depends on two components. The first is the instrumental
payoff: it is a payoff from retweeting when the state of the world is more clear: that is when
LR (η) is more extreme. Thus we assume that the instrumental payoff when you do not
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retweet, i.e., when r = 0, is 0 and when you do retweet, i.e., r = 1, is ϕ (LR (η|m,x; o, z, θ))
for some smooth increasing in distance function from 1, ϕ (·). What this captures is that
there is more instrumental value in passing on a message the greater certainty in the state
of the world. For instance if we set
ϕ (x) = f
(∣∣∣∣ x1 + x − 1
∣∣∣∣)
for a smooth increasing function f (·) on
[
0, 12
]
, the instrumental value is a monotone function
in the probability the state of the world is high, but other functions ϕ will also work.28
Further, due to taste or cost heterogeneity, there is a shock  to the instrumental payoff of
retweeting, where  is a mean-zero random variable drawn from a continuous CDF with full
support, such as the logit CDF Λ (·). Altogether, the instrumental payoff V r is given by
V r =
ϕ (LR (η|m,x; o, z, θ))−  if r = 10 if r = 0.
The second is the social perception payoff. Specifically F is concerned with the posterior
that his followers have about his type given his decision to retweet: ψ (P (θ = H|r)) where
ψ (·) is a monotonically increasing function. The perception in equilibrium is simply a
function of the retweet decision itself. The idea here is that someone who is more able is
more likely to be able to discern valuable topics and therefore the equilibrium decision to
retweet itself has a signaling component. 29
F ’s total utility is given by
U (r|m,x) = V r︸︷︷︸
instrumental
+λψ (P (θ = H|r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
perception
where λ ≥ 0 is a parameter that tunes the strength of the perception payoff. 30
Correspondently the marginal utility of choosing r = 1 versus r = 0 is given by
MU (r|m,x) = ϕ (LR (η|m,x; o, z, θ))− ︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in instrumental
+λ∆rψ (P (θ = H|r))︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in perception
.
LetQH (·) be the CDF of ϕ (LR (η|m,x; o, z,H))− andQL (·) be the CDF of ϕ (LR (η|m,x; o, z, L))−
.31 It immediately follows that QH FOSD QL. This can be seen by inspection, where the
28To see this, note that
ϕ (LR (η|m,x; o, z, θ)) = f
(∣∣∣∣ LR1 + LR − 1
∣∣∣∣) = f (∣∣∣∣P (η = 1|m,x; o, z, θ)− 12
∣∣∣∣)
which is just a smooth function of distance from pure uncertainty of a belief of 12 .29For simplicity we abstract from F ’s followers interpretation of m and their own subsequent private signals.
The reason is that we can demonstrate interesting non-monotonicities in retweeting behavior as a function
of message quality without such additions, which would only serve to complicate matters.
30While λ could be absorbed into ψ (·), it is useful for exposition to keep it separate.
31This holds fixed o and z.
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likelihood ratio under type H first order stochastically dominates that of type L when η = 1
and the inverse of the ratio first order stochastically dominates when η = 0. It will be useful
below to denote by Gθ the complementary CDF, Gθ := 1−Qθ, i.e., Gθ(v) is the fraction of
types θ with a (net-of-costs) instrumental value of passing greater than or equal to v.
A.3. Analysis. F decides to retweet if and only if MU (r|m,x) ≥ 0. This decision trades
off two components. On the one hand is the relative instrumental benefit (or cost) of pasing
on the message, which is an increasing function of the likelihood that the state of the world
η = 1, and is given by ϕ (LR (m,x|o, z, θ)). On the other hand, retweeting itself changes
the perception of F by his followers, given by∆rψ (P (θ = H|r)), and so the (equilibrium)
relative gain/loss of reputation must be taken into account.
The model is formally characterized in Proposition 1 of Chandrasekhar, Golub, and Yang
(2018), and we refer the interested reader to that paper for proofs. Chandrasekhar, Golub,
and Yang show that under the above assumptions, an equilibrium exists, and will be in cutoff
strategies where F chooses to retweet if and only if ϕ (LR (η|m,x; o, z, θ))−  ≥ v for some
v. An equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff v < 0, which is used by all F s irrespective of
type θ, where it is the solution to
v = λψ (P (θ = H|r = 0))− λψ (P (θ = H|r = 1)) .
Here the equilibrium posteriors are determined by:
P (θ = H|r = 0)
1− P (θ = H|r = 0) =
1− qGH (v)
1− qGL (v) and
P (θ = H|r = 1)
1− P (θ = H|r = 1) =
GH (v)
GL (v)
.
The intuition for the equilibrium is as follows. First, note that F ’s type does not matter
for the decision he makes conditional on the draw v. That is, while θ affects the distribution
of the instrumental value, once F knows his instrumental value, he is trading off that against
the change in reputation due to his behavior. Therefore the cutoff (in utility space) will not
depend on θ’s type.
At the cutoff v in equilibrium the marginal benefit of retweeting (which is a way to gain
reputation by being viewed as more likely to be a high type) must be equal to the marginal
cost of retweeting (which in this case is the instrumental benefit of passing the information
relative to the stochastic cost). The reason v < 0 is because here retweeting is a signal of
being the high type, and therefore some low types will opt into retweeting despite having a
negative net instrumental cost.
Holding fixed o, z as we have been doing above, we can compute the retweeting share in
equilibrium:
1
2GH (v) +
1
2GL (v) .
We can also look at several contrasting situations. In the first, assume that λ = 0 with
the same setup as above, so there is no interest in social concerns. Then only positive
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instrumental values are retweeted, so the share retweeting is given by
1
2GH (0) +
1
2GL (0) .
Clearly the retweeting share is lower than when there is also a signaling motive, which
featured an equilibrium cutoff v < 0.
A second contrasting situation is one in which while individuals would potentially care
about signaling, neither party is better at discerning the state of the world. That is, ĜH =
ĜL =: Ĝ. In this case the share retweeted again is only determined by positive instrumental
values and therefore is given by
Ĝ (0) .
Whether Ĝ (0) Q 12GH (v) +
1
2GL (v) depends on how Ĝ compares to GH and GL.
A subtle feature of the model is the fact that the retweet share is not necessarily mono-
tonically increasing in the quality of the message, α. Intuitively, there are two effects of
increasing α of retweeting. First, as α increases, the message becomes more informative.
This increases the instrumental value of retweeting, and hence retweeting increases with α.
Second, as α increases, the m signal becomes more informative relative to the private x sig-
nal. This makes the act of retweeting more about m than x, and hence lowers the signaling
value of retweeting. Indeed, in the limit where α = 1, there is no signaling value whatsoever.
Thus, the signaling effect leads to a reduction in the amount of retweeting as α increases.
Which effect dominates depends on parameters, and as we show now, in fact the effect of α
on retweeting can be non-monotonic under some configurations of parameters.
Figure 6 presents simulation results to further illustrate these intuitions. First consider
the case when there is no reputation considerations (λ = 0). In this case, as the message’s
quality increases, the share retweeting must increase clearly because the value of information
on average increases.
Next let us consider the case where neither H nor L are particularly able types, with
piH = 0.53 and piL = 0.5. In this case, there is limited scope for signaling because the priors
are quite poor: both types heavily lean on the message’s signal m rather than their personal
signals x. As such, like in the case with λ = 0, the quality of the message increases the share
to retweet.
In contrast, consider the case where both types are expert, but H-types are somewhat
better (piH = 0.95, piL = 0.9). In this case, with low α, since the predominant component of
instrumental value comes from type to begin with, and because high types are much more
likely to receive correct signals than low types but both have typically good signals about
the state of the world (so m and x will agree), many more L types will also find it worthwhile
to essentially “pool” with H types despite negative instrumental values due to reputation
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Figure 6. Retweet share for various combinations of (piH , piL, λ).
concerns. This leads to a monotonic decline in the retweet rate as α increases, since there
is increasing reliance on the m-signal. What this means in practice is that it is possible to
improve the quality of the message and yet decline the overall share of retweeting, contrary
to the naive intuition without a social perception payoff component.
The final case we show is the intermediate one, with piH = 0.65 and piL = 0.5. The
signaling effect at this parameter level dominates initially, and hence increasing α initially
decreases retweeting, but then eventually is dwarfed by the instrumental effect as the m-
signal is considerably better than the gap in quality for the x-signal across types.
The fact that the relationship between α and retweeting is non-monotonic means that it
is possible that mild increases in informativeness can reduce retweeting whereas dramatic
increases in informativeness can increase it.
A.4. Application to Experiment. In what follows, we use the above framework consider
possible implications of our experimental variations, i.e., (1) whether the originator is a
celebrity or a Jane/Joe, (2) whether the tweet has a source or not, (3) whether the tweet
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concerns a myth or not, and (4) whether F has received prior exposures. We ignore indexes
that are unnecessary in each case.
A.4.1. Celebrity versus Jane/Joe. Celebrities and Joes can vary in the quality of their mes-
saging. As such, we consider αC versus αJ . Ex ante it may be possible for these to have any
relationship, though we might think that celebrities tend to generate higher-quality signals.
This could be, for instance, because celebrities’ messages reach many more individuals and
therefore they need to be more cautious in their messaging, or could be because they have
better access to information in general.
Assuming αC ≥ αJ and since η = 1 for an experimental topic (since all our messages are
sent about true beneficial effects of immunization),
Em,x [ϕ (LR (η|m,x;C, θ))] ≥ Em,x [ϕ (LR (η|m,x; J, θ))]
and therefore the distribution of instrumental payoffs QC,θ  QJ,θ for each θ. Note that this
depends both on the originator and the type of the individual.
To see the effect, consider the case when αC → 1. In this case, following the intuition
discussed above, QC,H → QC,L and let Q̂C (·) be the resulting CDF of the instrumental
value, so there is nothing to signal at all. Thus vC = 0 and so anyone with any positive
instrumental value immediately retweets. In contrast, with Joes, as above there is some
negative vJ < 0 that sets the equilibrium.
Consequently, the retweeting share is given by
• ĜC (0) under Celebrity origination and
• 12GJ,H
(
vJ
)
+ 12GJ,L
(
vJ
)
under Joe origination.
Notice that it is not clear which dominates. On the one hand, since η = 1 is essentially
revealed as αC → 1, ĜC has a higher mean than GJ,θ for either θ. On the other hand, the
cutoff vJ can be considerably below 0 making the point of evaluating the GJ,θ CDFs at a
lower point. This is because the likelihood ratio distribution of knowing that we are in a
“good” world is not the same under celebrities (where it is substantially more likely) and
Joes/Janes (where it is less likely, but there is a signaling effect reason to retweet).
Remark 1. The total endorsement effect we identify in the experiment can be thought of
being comprised of (a) a shift in instrumental value and (b) a shift in the threshold to retweet
due to the signaling effect. To see this
1
2
[
ĜC (0)−GJ,H
(
vJ
)]
+ 12
[
ĜC (0)−GJ,L
(
vJ
)]
= 12
[
ĜC (0)−GJ,H (0)
]
+ 12
[
GJ,z,H (0)−GJ,H
(
vJ
)]
+ 12
[
ĜC (0)−GJ,L (0)
]
+ 12
[
GJ,z,L (0)−GJ,L
(
vJ
)]
.
In this expression, the ĜC (0) − GJ,θ (0) term measures how for a given cutoff of 0, the
amount of retweets increases when a message is originated by the celebrity, and the the
WHEN CELEBRITIES SPEAK 49
GJ,θ (0) − GJ,θ
(
vJ
)
term measures the change in the share of retweets when we move the
cutoff to the left due to the signaling effect, holding the distribution fixed. When the signaling
impetus is dominant, this second term can overtake the prior term, making even a celebrity
originator generate a lower volume of retweets.
A.4.2. Sourcing. In this case, holding originator fixed, we study the effect of adding a source.
The analysis is identical to the case with celebrities. Ex-ante it seems reasonable to model
sourcing as having direct positive effect on the likelihood of the signal being true: αS ≥ αNS.
Consequently
Em,x [ϕ (LR (η|m,x;S, θ))] ≥ Em,x [ϕ (LR (η|m,x;NS, θ))] .
This comes from the fact that a sourced tweet is just more likely to be right, so the likelihood
ratio will be higher in distribution so for every originator and type of F , sourced tweets have
more value in distribution so QS  QNS.
Again, if we assume sources are fully revealing αS → 1 but without a source we have
vNS < 0. Retweeting shares are given by ĜS (0) and 12GNS,H
(
vNS
)
+ 12GNS,L
(
vNS
)
under
sourcing and no sourcing, respectively.
Crucially, even assuming sources are intrinsically good, retweeting can be reduced. This
comes from the fact that the perception payoff effect can simply outweigh the gains in quality.
If there is a source there is nothing to signal, whereas if there is no source F has a signaling
motivation that is traded off against quality.
Remark 2. A natural question to ask is whether the since the arguments for celebrity versus
Joe/Jane and sourced versus unsourced are identical, if anything seemingly relabeling, then
the effects of sourced messaging and celebrity origination must have the same sign. But
more careful reflection demonstrates that this is not true. Recall that retweeting share can be
non-monotonic in α in this model. That is, given an initial α, a move to some α′ > α can
lead to a decline in retweeting share and whether this is the case can depend on (piH , piL, λ).
Concretely, recall the case of (piH = 0.65, piL = 0.5, λ = 50) in Figure 6 where the retweet
share is non-monotonic with α. Thus, the increase due to a celebrity versus the increase due
to adding a source need not be the same and in fact can generate different signs on retweeting
behavior.
A.4.3. Myths. We discuss the case of myths briefly as the argument is similar, though not
identical, to the above argument. A myth can be thought of as a topic where the priors
(i.e., the informativeness of the private signals in the language above) are worse for all types:
pimythθ < pi
none
θ . Of course, it may be the case that more able types face a relatively smaller
decline in prior belief quality relative to less able types, or it may be the opposite. Following
the same arguments as above, just as the model can be non-monotonic in α, moving to
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myths from non-myth topics can increase or decrease the retweet share. To see the intuition,
if myths ensure that neither type has strong priors to begin with, then there is no signaling
impetus whatsoever. So the quality of their signals and the quality of the message entirely
drives the retweet share. In contrast, if there is considerable scope for signaling as high
types are differentially more able to distinguish myths (rather than non-myths) relative to
low types, then retweeting can increase.
A.4.4. Exposure. Finally, we look at the effect of having multiple historical exposures to a
topic.
The first simple way to think about this is as follows. Consider the case where F has
received (and for the sake of discussion passed on) multiple messages mt for m1, ...,mk−1
about η in the past. Then the prior coming into the kth event is closer to the truth and the
marginal value of mk is lower, thereby reducing the instrumental value to F to passing on
mk. This can make the retweeting share concave in k.
There is a second way to think about this, further incorporating the signaling component
of the model. To see this, suppose that every message is about independent concepts (so ηt
is independent every period t), so the commonality between all prior exposures is mediated
only through F ’s followers’ perception of F ’s types. That is, every instance of retweeting a
message updates F ’s followers beliefs about F ’s type which then serves as the prior going
into the next period. Exposure then affects the beliefs in this dynamic manner.
As above let k denote the number of prior exposures and Pk (a = H) be the prior in round
k + 1. We can see that Pk (a = H) → 1{a=H} as k → ∞; that as the number of rounds
tend to infinity, the type is revealed even in the signaling game. This can be seen as a
consequence of the martingale convergence theorem. In this way, signaling is self-limiting.
Loosely speaking, what this means is that with many exposures the signaling impetus can be
small (which is equivalent to the λ = 0 case). In this case individuals only retweet positive
information, so relative to cases with a signaling impetus, it is even possible for the retweet
rate to decline.
All told, the effect of exposures therefore is an empirical matter in terms of whether
and when the marginal exposure does not matter and even whether it can adversely affect
retweeting rates.
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Appendix B. Does content affect retweeting?
Table B.1. How Content Affects Retweeting by F1 likes/retweets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES # Pooled # Retweets # Likes # Pooled # Retweets
Myth-busting Facts 0.588 0.627 0.518 -0.0481 0.136
(0.319) (0.346) (0.381) (0.296) (0.413)
[0.0654] [0.0698] [0.174] [0.871] [0.742]
Access Info 0.402 0.319 0.530 0.315 0.477
(0.258) (0.292) (0.309) (0.294) (0.366)
[0.118] [0.275] [0.0863] [0.284] [0.192]
Importance Info 0.543 0.526 0.565 0.466 0.442
(0.229) (0.267) (0.290) (0.246) (0.343)
[0.0178] [0.0487] [0.0516] [0.0578] [0.197]
Celeb writes and tweets 1.040 1.327
(0.283) (0.374)
[0.000242] [0.000382]
Myth × Celeb Direct 0.652 0.432
(0.381) (0.485)
[0.0871] [0.374]
Access × Celeb Direct -0.0101 -0.299
(0.374) (0.451)
[0.979] [0.508]
Importance × Celeb Direct 0.0558 0.00945
(0.314) (0.406)
[0.859] [0.981]
Myth × Celeb RT Org 0.250 0.147
(0.290) (0.384)
[0.389] [0.701]
Access × Celeb RT Org 0.103 -0.0418
(0.244) (0.256)
[0.672] [0.870]
Importance × Celeb RT Org 0.135 0.402
(0.215) (0.190)
[0.531] [0.0348]
Observations 492 492 492 492 492
Depvar Mean 3.644 3.644 3.644 3.644 3.644
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the celebrity/organization level) are reported in
parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. All columns include fixed effects for num-
ber of non-exception tweets assigned and condition on non-exception tweets. The omitted
category is non-myth facts.
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Appendix C. Does RT count affect retweeting?
Table C.1. Impact of No. of Forced Joe RTs on F2 and F1 likes/retweets
(1) (2)
F2 F1
Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES # Retweets # Retweets
5 Forced Joe RTs assigned 0.0399 0.444
(0.346) (0.388)
[0.908] [0.252]
10 Forced Joe RTs assigned 0.244 0.0395
(0.414) (0.440)
[0.556] [0.928]
15 Forced Joe RTs assigned 0.256 0.207
(0.407) (0.359)
[0.529] [0.565]
Observations 505 184
Phase Control X X
Log #followers control X X
Message style control X X
Depvar Mean 0.184 2.707
1 Forced Joe RT assigned log mean -2.331 0.870
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. p-
values are reported in brackets.
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Appendix D. Effect of celebrity retweeting organizations
Table D.1. Reach vs. Endorsement: Value of Celeb Endorsement for Joes
and Organizations through Involvement measured by F2 likes/retweets
(1) (2) (3)
Poisson Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES # Pooled # Retweets # Likes
Celeb writes and tweets 0.423 0.421 0.574
(0.182) (0.179) (0.520)
[0.0201] [0.0185] [0.269]
Org writes and Celeb retweets 0.564 0.600 0.255
(0.221) (0.258) (0.520)
[0.0107] [0.0200] [0.624]
Observations 1,791 1,791 1,791
Joe writes mean 0.0417 0.0343 0.00745
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the original tweet level) are
reported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. The
sample conditions on tweets that are not sensitive and includes
tweets originated by Joes, organizations, and celebrities. All re-
gressions control for phase, celebrity fixed effects, and content
fixed effects.
Table D.2. Value of Celeb Endorsement for Joes and Organizations through
Composition measured by F1 likes/retweets
(1) (2) (3)
Poisson Poisson Poisson
VARIABLES # Pooled # Retweets # Likes
Celeb writes and tweets 1.205 1.411 0.913
(0.102) (0.105) (0.131)
[0] [0] [0]
Org writes and Celeb retweets 0.0597 0.246 -0.208
(0.135) (0.128) (0.180)
[0.658] [0.0540] [0.247]
Observations 452 452 452
Joe writes and Celeb retweets mean 2.058 1.045 1.013
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the original tweet level) are re-
ported in parentheses. p-values are reported in brackets. The sample
conditions on tweets that are not sensitive and includes tweets origi-
nated by Joes, organizations, and celebrities. All regressions control for
phase, celebrity fixed effects, and content fixed effects.
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Appendix E. Do opinions change?
Table E.1. Was there opinion change?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Ologit Ologit Ologit
VARIABLES Opinion Index Beneficial Safe Importance
Std. Exposure to tweets 0.00900 -0.0795 0.0758 0.0430
(0.0292) (0.0703) (0.0637) (0.0753)
[0.758] [0.259] [0.234] [0.568]
{.888} {.469} {.611} {.642}
Observations 2,441 2,441 2,441 2,441
Potential exposure control X X X X
Double Post-LASSO X X X X
Depvar Mean 0.00 3.679 3.409 3.752
Notes: Standard errors (clustered at the combination of celebs followed level)
are reported in parentheses. Clustered p-values are reported in brackets. Ran-
domization inference (RI) p-values are reported in braces. Demographic con-
trols include age, sex, province, dummy for urban area and dummy for hav-
ing children. One standard deviation of exposure is 14.96 tweets. Column 1
presents a (standardized) index from the first principal component of a PCA
decomposition of the three indices.
